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ILLINOIS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
John H. Doeringer*
Illinois has more than 130 administrative agencies, and a welter of rules,
regulations, statutes and court decisions govern their operation. The author suggests that certain recent advancements have ameliorated the staggering complexity of Illinois administrative law, but that other developments have aggravated the confusion. The author analyzes proposed legislation, now under consideration, which is aimed at clarifying the procedural confusion of agency business, and he critiques recent Illinois Supreme
Court rulings concerning standing for agency review and the quantum of
proof required in board hearings. Finally, the author explores areas which
may require further resolution-including two conflicting appellate court
holdings regarding agency penalty power, and appellate decisions dealing
with a board's evidentiary findings.
INTRODUCTION

DMINISTRATIVE law concerns the powers and processes em-

ployed by agencies of government as they affect the rights
and interests of private individuals or corporations, on the
one hand, and the health, safety and general welfare of the public on
the other. Even when agencies engage in rights adjustment between
two private parties, such as in a workman's compensation hearing,
there is an underlying concern for the interests of the general public. Licensing, zoning, civil service, pollution control, and public utilities regulation all indicate the pervasive influence of administrative
law at the state level. Much of administrative law focuses on the
legislation which controls the quality of the proceedings before governmental bodies. A second focus of administrative law is on the
courts, where the decisions of agencies are tested on appeal by aggrieved parties. The third, and least observable, focus of administrative law is on the actual operation of the administrative bodies
themselves.
Of these three foci, only the first two readily lend themselves to
comment, since, in Illinois, legislative acts and court decisions are
the only regularly reported aspects of the administrative process.
* General Attorney, Illinois Central Gulf Railroad, Chicago, Illinois. The author gratefully acknowledges the research and writing assistance of James Pancheri
and Stanley Griffith, members of the DePaul Law Review staff.
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Hence, this article will report on these two areas of the law of administrative agencies.
ILLINOIS STATUTES AND PENDING LEGISLATION

Illinois presently has two general statutes dealing with administrative law: the Administrative Review Act' and an act establishing
rules and regulations of state agencies.2 In addition to these statutes of general applicability, the administrative lawyer must consult
the statutes governing the specific subject matter under consideration to determine which agencies, if any, have jurisdiction and what,
if any, procedures for dealing with the appropriate agency are specified within the statute.
The Administrative Review Act provides for review of final administrative orders by the circuit courts, a process initiated by the filing
of a complaint and the issuance of a summons to the agency responsible for the final order. The type of judicial review intended
by the Act is limited to a review of the record with appeal to the appellate court and ultimately to the supreme court.'
The Administrative Review Act is not applicable to an agency's
proceedings unless the legislation establishing the agency adopts it
by specific reference as the method for review. One hundred seventy-five paragraphs in the 1971 Illinois Revised Statutes adopt the
Administrative Review Act, but at least twenty-three areas of administrative law do not expressly incorporate the Administrative Review Act. Although substantially greater uniformity in the law
would result from including most of these twenty-three administrative agencies within the provisions of the Act, there are no bills
presently pending in the legislature to accomplish this objective. 4
Another major gap in the Illinois administrative law framework
is the absence of uniformity in the fashion in which agencies conduct
their business and the lack of a uniform method by which interested parties may determine what are the appropriate procedures for
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 264-279 (1971).
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, §§ 263-268.1 (1971) (establishes filing procedure
for rules adopted by administrative agencies and the form which rules shall take).
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 272, 276 (1971).
4. Fins, Need for Uniformity in Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions,
61 ILL.B.J. 366 (1973) (The author suggests that orders of the Illinois Commerce
Commission, the Illinois Industrial Commission, and decisions of electoral boards
ought to be excluded from review under the Administrative Review Act).
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each agency. 5 On the federal level, the Administrative Procedure
Act6 accomplishes these objectives.
The Seventy-Eighth Illinois General Assembly has before it two
bills, which taken together, establish a state Administrative Procedure Act.7 This state procedural plan would be similar to the Administrative Review Act insofar as it would not be effective until incorporated by reference in the laws creating each administrative
agency." The plan would:
1. Require each agency to adopt and publish highly specific rules
and procedures for conduct of its business so as to have them
available to the public on request.
2. Establish a carefully detailed procedure for rule-making requiring notice to concerned parties of proposed rules; publication
of proposed actions; opportunity for concerned parties to make
their views known orally or in writing; publication and filing
with the Secretary of State of all adopted rules ten days before
the effective date of the rule; and use in only very limited instances of emergency rule-making power where time does not
permit notice, publication, and hearings.
3. Require that each agency compile, publish and index all of its
existing rules at least once every two years.
4. Provide a procedure by which a party may petition for the
adoption of a rule.
5. Institute a procedure by which a party may petition to contest
a finding or rule of an agency.
6. Clarify the type of evidence which an agency may consider in
its deliberations, allowing for the admission of all evidence "of
a type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent men in the
conduct of their affairs" (even if not admissible under the rules
of evidence in a court of law) and also allowing for official
notice of facts particularly within the agency's expertise pro5. Freehling, Administrative Procedure Legislation in Illinois, 57 ILL. B.J. 364
(1968).
6. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500 et seq. (1970).
7. H.B. 138, 78th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1973); H.B. 139, 78th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1973) (H.B. 139 is a companion to H.B. 138, amending Rules and Regulations
of State Agencies to prevent overlap with the state Administrative Procedure Act;
see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, §§ 263-268.1 (1971)).
8. H.B. 138, § 12(a), 78th IM.Gen. Assembly (1973).
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vided that each contesting party is afforded an opportunity
to rebut those facts.
7. Place substantial limitations on ex parte proceedings and orders.
8. Protect certain procedural due process rights of licensees and
parties affected by decisions relating to regulated industriesfor example, a licensee who made timely application for renewal
of a license would be protected against expiration until the
agency either granted or denied the renewal.
The Administrative Procedure Act will be considered in the 1974
session of the Seventy-Eighth General Assembly. The number of
articles in recent legal publications regarding the problem and the
general support the legislation has received from the organized bar
testify to the need for such legislation.9 The Administrative Procedure Act will complement the Administrative Review Act by contributing to a substantially higher quality of agency proceeding and
by insuring the production of a better record for judicial review.
MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE

A number of recent Illinois rulings have focused upon the question of whether the manifest weight of the evidence supports the administrative agency's decision. As a general matter, the Illinois
courts of review regularly hold it to be the agency's function to resolve evidentiary conflicts and determine the credibility of witnesses.
Normally, the agency's decisions on these issues will not be overturned unless they are against the "manifest weight of the evidence"
as presented in the record. The recent cases of Brown v. Industrial
Commission'° and Hartwell v. Industrial Commission" best exemplify the Illinois review standard in operation.
In Brown, plaintiff, a handtruck loader, filed a claim against his
employer under the Workman's Compensation Act,' 2 based on his
9.

See H.

FINS, ILLINOIS ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE vii-viii

(1942);

Administrative Procedure Legislation in Illinois, 57 ILL. BJ. 364

Freehling,

(1968); NA-

TIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING IN ITS SEVEN-

81, 84, 87, 199-223 (1961); Hunt, Administrative Procedure-An Additional Plea, 57 ILL..B.J. 644 (1969); Comment, Administrative Procedure LegislaTIETH YEAR

tion Among the States, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 634 (1964).
10. 51 111. 2d 291, 281 N.E.2d 673 (1973).
11.
12.

51 fll.
2d 562, 283 N.E.2d 870 (1972).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 138 et seq. (1971).
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hospitalization for a wrist pain. Brown's family doctor testified at
the arbitration hearing and opined that there could indeed be a
causal connection between the plaintiff's work and the injured wrist.
However, an orthopedic surgeon, who had also treated Brown, related that the wrist pain, in his opinion, was most probably caused
by an old elbow injury which he had discovered during his examination of the plaintiff. On this basis, the arbitrator held that Brown
had not proved the necessary causal connection between his work
and the injury, and denied the claim for compensation. The supreme court affirmed the arbitrator's decision, since a mere inferential showing of plaintiff's contention was not sufficient to establish
that the decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence."
However, Illinois courts do not use the manifest weight standard
to merely rubber-stamp agency rulings, as the Hartwell case so well
evidences. Here, plaintiff William Hartwell challenged before the
supreme court an Industrial Commission ruling that he did not lose
his eyesight as a result of an industrial accident and was therefore
not entitled to compensation.
Hartwell, a beef lugger, was struck in the eye by a piece of metal
as he was loading meat, and subsequently lost the use of the eye due
to the development of a cataract. Two eye specialists at the hearing
testified that the cataract was non-traumatic and did not result from
Hartwell's accident, while two opposing specialists declared the accident directly caused the cataract. If the court had simply applied
the Brown standard for conflicting expert testimony, the agency ruling would have been upheld, since there was substantial evidence
to support the decision. There was no real conflict in the expert
testimony-the two doctors seeing no causal connection between the
vision loss and the accident never considered that previous to the
mishap Hartwell could see and after it he could not. Hence, "[t]he
only testimony which took cognizance of this fact established a
causal relationship between the disability and the employment,"1' 4
13. 51 M1.2d at 295, 281 N.E.2d at 676.
14. 51 Ill.
2d at 566, 283 N.E.2d at 872. There have also been other recent
decisions in which the courts have determined that the agency findings were
against the manifest weight of the evidence. See Smith v. O'Keefe, 9 Ill. App. 3d
814, 293 N.E.2d 142 (1973) (Board of Fire and Police Commissioner's finding that
la fireman was guilty of leaving the scene of a fire without permission, thereby
justifying his dismissal); Fomey v. Civil Service Comm'n, 10 Ill.App. 3d 80,

293 N.E.2d 450 (1973)

(Civil Service Commission's decree that the appellant's
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dictating a reversal of the agency finding as contrary to the manifest
weight of the evidence.
While Brown and Hartwell represent generally accepted principles
of appellate review which Illinois courts adhere to in cases raising
the manifest weight issue, it should be noted that those principles are
applied to a very broad range of substantive law problems. Substantive law questions raised in the administrative process during the
past year included issues of employment compensation, employees'
rights, licensing and zoning appeals. 15
ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTY POWER

Several cases in the Illinois appellate courts dealt with the power
of the legislature to vest an administrative agency with fine-levying
authority. Although these cases all focused on the penalty power
delegated to the Pollution Control Board, the ultimate reconciliation of the contradictory results may be expected to have broader
implications for other legislative attempts to put teeth into social legislation.' 6 At the base of these decisions lies the question: does
geographical transfer was in good faith and in the best interest of the department);
Deckstader v. Hartnett, 8 Ill. App. 3d 26, 288 N.E.2d 720 (1972) (Zoning Administrator's ruling that appellant's use of his property did not constitute a legal nonconforming use); McIntyre v. Pollution Control Bd., 8 Ill. App. 3d 1026, 291
N.E.2d 253 (1972) (Pollution Control Board's decision that the accused intended
and did cause fires to be used for the purpose of disposing of refuse in the operation of an auto salvage business).
15. Numerous cases decided this year have upheld the agency's findings as not
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Some of these cases are: Peterson v.
Bd. of Trustees of Fireman's Pension Fund, 54 Ill. 2d 260, 296 N.E.2d 721 (1973)
(Firemen's Pension Fund Board's finding that despite injury appellant was still able
to perform duties as fireman); Wexler v. Indus. Comm'n, 52 Ill. 2d 506, 288
N.E.2d 420 (1972) (Industrial Commission's finding that decedent's death arose out
of his employment); Metro. Sanitary Dist. v. Huston, 9 Ill. App. 3d 855, 293
N.E.2d 425 (1973) (Sanitary District's Civil Service Board's ruling that an employee failed to conduct fair and impartial civil service examinations); Jackson v.
Ill. Liquor Control Comm'n, 10 Il. App. 3d 496, 295 N.E.2d 536 (1973) (Illinois
Liquor Control Commission's order to revoke the appellant's liquor license on the
ground that he permitted the premises to be used for gambling); Moriarity v.
Police Bd., 7 Ill. App. 3d 978, 289 N.E.2d 32 (1972) (Police Board's decision that
an off duty policeman was driving while intoxicated and as a result negligently
caused an auto accident, thereby justifying his dismissal from the force); Brown
v. Bd. of Review, 8 Ill. App. 3d 18, 289 N.E.2d 75 (1972) (Board of Review finding
that plaintiff was not entitled to unemployment compensation since she had not
actively sought new employment); Seipel v. State Employee's Retirement Sys.,
8 Ill. App. 3d 182, 289 N.E.2d 288 (1972) (State Employee's Retirement System
finding that decedent had not effectively nominated a death-bed beneficiary).
16. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 59.2 (1972) (Recent amendments to the
Health and Safety Act give the Director of Labor or his representative authority to
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a statutory grant of penalty power to an administrative agency offend
article VI, section 1 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution insofar as it
constitutes an impermissible delegation of judicial authority,'1 7 or article II section 1 insofar as such a delegation violates the separation
8
of powers doctrine?'
The cases suggest that a concern for procedural due process underpins the delegation question. Does the delegation of judicial or
quasi-judicial power result in a denial of the right to trial by jury,
in the elimination of the presumption of innocence afforded a defendant in a criminal trial, and in a reduction of the state's burden
to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? Such issues were thrown
into sharp focus in several noteworthy Illinois cases.
Ford v. EnvironmentalProtection Agency 9
Appearing before the Third District Appellate Court, petitioner
C.M. Ford sought review of a Pollution Control Board order issued
under section 1031 of the Environmental Control Act,2 0 which required conformity with certain Environmental Protection Agency
standards and which allowed the Board to assess a civil penalty for
violations existing to date. The court answered each of the appellant's objections to the fine and held, inter alia,that:
1. The statutory grant of penalty powers to the Pollution Control Board
is not an unconstitutional delegaton of judicial power, nor does it violate the separation of powers provisions.

2.

Although administrative agencies have no inherent judicial power, the
legislature, by express statutory grant, may confer upon an agency or
officer the authority to levy fines and penalties, which are civil in nature and not criminal.

levy fines of under $1,000 for non-serious violations, $1,000 for serious violations,
and up to $10,000 for wilful or repeated violations of the standards or rules promulgated by the department. The statute is analogous to the Environmental Protection Act in that it provides for both civil and criminal liability); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 48, §§ 851-861 (1971) (The Fair Employment Practices Act authorizes the hearing officer, subject to review by the full commission and the court, to ". . . take such

further affirmative or other actions with respect to the complainant as will eliminate
the effect of the practice originally complained of......
This section of the Act
has generally been construed by the Commission to include an award of damages).
17. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 1 provides that: "The judicial power is vested in a
Supreme Court, an Appellate Court and Circuit Courts."
18. ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1 states: "The legislative, executive and judicial
branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another."
19. 9 111. App. 3d 711, 292 N.E.2d 540 (1973).
20. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. Ill/2, § 1031 (1971).
Section 1041 of this Act provides for judicial review subject to the Administrative Review Act except that re-

view is by the appellate court.

8
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Article I, section 13 of the Constitution of 1970, which guarantees
the right to a jury trial, is not offended by a civil proceeding before
an agency.21
Appellant's argument concerning the agency's burden of proof is meritless, as the agency by statute need only make out a prima facie
case that appellant violated the regulations, and such a showing shifts
the burden to the violator who then must demonstrate the reasonableness of his conduct. And, since burden and presumption go to the rules
of evidence established by law, the legislature has power to shift the
22
burden to the accused in certain circumstances.

The court's reasoning concerning the delegation question rested
on an analogy to licensing and state taxation cases,25 in which it
quoted a precedental holding from Department of Finance v. Gan-

dolfi:
An administrative officer empowered to issue and revoke licenses to engage
in business or profession necessarily exercises quasi judicial powers in determining whether a license should be issued or revoked, but such exercse
of power is incidental to the duty of administering the law and does not
constitute the exercise of judicial power within the prohibiton of the con24
stitution.

The court furthermore anticipated arguments that the ministerial
act of revoking a license or imposing a mathematically computed
penalty along a statutory formula could be distinguished from the
discretionary setting of a penalty or fine for a law violation or a rule
infraction.' Such a distinction was without significance since
in terms of severity . . . a monetary penalty is insignificant when it is
considered that the revocation of a license . . . may result in the destruction of a valuable business, or in depriving a licensee of his ordinary means
of livelihood .... 25

In short, the Ford court held that penalty power must be a mere
incident to the administration of law; that penalties do not necessarily imply the existence of judicial power or impermissible dele21. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 13 states: "The right of trial by jury as heretofore
enjoyed shall remain inviolate." The court reasoned that the right to a jury trial
attaches only to those actions which at common law required a jury and that such a
civil proceeding was unknown at common law. 9 Ill. App. 3d at 719, 292
N.E.2d at 545.
22. 9 Ill. App. 3d at 720-21, 292 N.E.2d at 546-47; accord, People v. Beck,
305 Ill. 593, 137 N.E. 454 (1932).
23. Cermak Club, Inc. v. Ill. Liquor Comm'n, 30 Ill. 2d 90, 195 N.E.2d 178
(1963); Gadlin v. Auditor of Pub. Accounts, 414 11. 89, 110 N.E.2d 234 (1953);
Dep't of Finance v. Gandolfi, 375 Ill. 237, 30 N.E.2d 737 (1940).
24. 375 Ill. 237, 240, 30 N.E.2d 737, 739 (1940), as quoted in 9 MI1.
App. 3d at
717, 292 N.E.2d at 544.
25. 9 Ill. App. 3d at.718, 292 N.E.2d at 545.
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gation; and that the right to jury trial and the normal procedural
rights of a criminal defendant do not attach in proceedings which
are essentially civil in nature and hitherto unknown at common law.
Bath, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board2" concurred with the reasoning in Ford and answered negatively the question of whether an
administrative agency must prove intent or scienter, rationalizing
that even in criminal cases intent is not an element of a regulatory
offense.
In a related case, the Citizens Utilities Company challenged the
Pollution Control Board's authority to levy a monetary penalty as
a condition attached to a variance. Unlike Ford and Bath, where
as part of a final order a fine was imposed after a determination
that a violation occurred, the Pollution Control Board attempted to
merge the penalty power granted in one section of the act with the
power to grant variances found in a different section.28 Judge Siedenfeld sustained, in dicta, the Ford doctrine on delegation of penalty power, but cited Gandolfi for the proposition that an agency's
penalty powers must be created by a clear, explicit expression of legislative intent, and never by construction. Siedenfeld further held
that the statutory language establishing the variance procedure for
the Pollution Control Board was not such an express delegation, and
hence, the Board's action was ultra vires2 9
0

City of Waukegan v. EnvironmentalProtectionAgency3

Waukegan expressly disapproved of Ford-Judge Guild of the
Second District Appellate Court held the grant of penalty power to the
Pollution Control Board violated the prohibition on delegation of
judicial authority. Distinguishing the tax and license cases cited in
Ford, Waukegan saw the process of assessing variable monetary
fines (such as hearing evidence, determining guilt, and fixing appropriate sanctions) so highly discretionary as to be judicial rather
than quasi-judicial, and distinctly separate from imposing tax pen26. 10 Ill. App. 3d 507, 294 N.E.2d 778 (1973).
27. See also City of Monmouth v. Environmental Protection Agency, 10 Ill. App.
3d 823, 295 N.E.2d 136 (1973), which agrees with Ford.
28. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111%, §§ 1035-1038 (1971).
29. Citizens Utilities Co. v. Ill. Pollution Control Bd., 9 Ill. App. 3d 158,
289 N.E.2d 642 (1972).
App. 3d 189, 296 N.E.2d 102 (1973).
30. 11 M11.
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alties or revoking licenses. This distinction between ministerial acts
and discretionary acts was seen as the crucial factor in determining
whether the agency's power was judicial, and, therefore, unconstitutional. 81
The Waukegan opinion drew a vigorous dissent from Judge Siedenfeld, 82 who wrote the majority opinion in Citizens Utility Co.
Judge Siedenfeld opined that although the discretionary-ministerial
dichotomy is one consideration, it should not be dispositive of the
entire constitutional question; common sense would seem to allow
an agency to impose a variable penalty based on the infraction's severity rather than limit the administrator to the all-or-nothing sanction of license revocation. Furthermore, since pollution control is
a serious problem which requires a streamlined procedure to compel
compliance-a procedure which courts by their nature cannot afford
-the problem lends itself to solution by an agency which can develop the required special knowledge necessary for intelligent decisions. Judge Siedenfeld argued that clear limitations are placed on
the Board's powers to guard against abuse of discretion: (1) the
amount of the fine is limited; (2) standards are provided to guide
the board in enforcement proceedings; (3) a hearing replete with
procedural safeguards is required; (4) the investigatory and prosecutorial functions are segregated from the adjudicating functions
within the Environmental Protection Agency; and (5) the circuit
court may reverse the Board's findings for abuse of discretion."
Considering the impact of Ford and Waukegan, the issue of the
constitutionality of legislative delegation of penalty powers to administrative agencies will probably require a supreme court determination. Whatever the decision, it is sure to have ramifications on
the legislature's efforts to adopt other forms of social legislationan impact reaching far beyond the question of the Environmental
Protection Agency's penalty powers.
31. Id. at 104-06, 296 N.E.2d at 191-94.
1111. App. 3d 196-202, 296 N.E.2d 108-12.
32.
33. See Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 713 (1969)
(The author suggests that the whole concept of delegation is a dead letter insofar
as it operates to check abusive exercise of power by administrative agencies. What
he suggests, strongly supports Judge Siedenfeld's position that the real focus of the
court's attention should be on the degree to which an agency observes procedural
standards which guarantee fundamental fairness and which act as a check against
arbitrary or capricious exercises of power).
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STANDING FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

As a general proposition, a party is without standing to secure
judicial review of an administrative order unless he can demonstrate that he is personally aggrieved, or that he has sustained an injury-in-fact to a particular right of his own as a result of the administrative action.3 4 Recent cases before the Illinois Supreme Court
were concerned with standing issues involved in inter-agency reviews
and appeals by aggrieved non-parties of record.
Departmentof Registration & Education v. Aman "
How is the general touchstone for standing, formulated largely in
terms of a personal perspective, applied when one state agency seeks
review of the actions of another agency?
In Aman, the defendant-appellant had been discharged from his
position of professional license investigator by the Department of
Registration and Education with the approval of the Department of
Personnel, and he requested a hearing before the Civil Service Commission. The Commission ordered Aman reinstated; thereupon the
Registration Department filed under the Administrative Review Act"8
for review of the Commission's decision. The circuit court dismissed the department's complaint, but the Fourth District Appellate Court reversed and held that this inter-agency judicial review
was justified.s'
The appellate court reasoned that the "personally aggrieved" test
may be appropriate for individuals but was unsuited for administrative agencies-obviously a board would have difficulty showing
a "threat to a particular right of [its] own as distinguished from [its]
public interest." Instead, the standing issue regarding administrative agencies depends upon some "interest" or "duty" prescribed by
statute, and if such "interest" or "duty" exists, one government board
34. See Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 172 (1970); Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970); F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 541 (1965);
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.18 (1958).
35. 53 Ill. 2d 522, 292 N.E.2d 897 (1973).
36. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 264 et seq. (1971).
37. 3 I1. App. 3d 784, 790, 279 N.E.2d 114, 118 (1972). See Nagan, Administrative Law 1971-72 Survey of Illinois Law, 22 DEPAUL L. REv. 96, 111-14 (1972)
for a comprehensive discussion of the appellate court decision.
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has standing to "litigate the action of another agency of the same
government.""8

The supreme court affirmed, but asserted that the "great diversity
in the statutory provisions creating or conferring power upon ad-

ministrative agencies" 9 precluded the universal application of any
simplistic black-letter test for standing; rather, the supreme court issued a new formula to determine whether an administrative agency

had standing to appeal the decision of another agency:
[13n each instance the question must be determined by the pertinent statutory provisions, the relationship which the agencies bear to each other,
and the nature of the controversy out of which the administrative decision
40
arises.

This new standing test would allow constitutionally sanctioned interagency review. 41
Applying the formula, the court assessed the statutory provisions
for judicial review in the Personnel Code4 2 and the scope of the Administrative Review Act. 48 Regarding the agencies' relationship to

each other, an examination of the Personnel Code indicates the legislature intended the Civil Service Commission to be an
independent agency empowered to decide matters within the scope of its
statutory power, independent of, and adversely to, the Department of Personnel and every state agency whose employees are subject to the Person44
nel Code.
38. 3 Ill. App. 3d at 786, 279 N.E.2d at 115-16.
39. See Freehling, Administrative Procedure Legislation in Illinois, 57 ILL. B.J.
364 (1969), which maintains that there are more than 130 administrative agencies
and a labyrinth of rules and regulations governing their operation.
40. 53 Ill. 2d at 525, 292 N.E.2d at 898.
41. "Tr]here is no constitutional principle which prevents a governmental
agency from seeking administrative review of the decision of another agency."
53 Ill. 2d at 524, 292 N.E.2d at 898.
42. ILL. REV. STAT. cl.. 127, § 63bl1la (1971): "All final administrative decisions of the Civil Service Commission hereunder shall be subject to judicial review
pursuant to the provisions of the 'Administrative Review Act'...."
43. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 265 (1971): "This Act shall apply to and govem every action to review judicially a final decision of any administrative agency
where the Act creating . . . such agency . . . adopts the provisions of this Act;"
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 104/, § 119 (1971): "A person affected by a final admin-

istrative decision of the Department may seek review only under the Administrative
Review Act. . .

."

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 108% § 18-164 (1971):

"The provisions

of the 'Administrative ReviewAct' . . . shall apply to and govern all proceedings
for the final judicial review of final administrative decisions. .... "
44. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 63b107c (1971) allows for the gubernatorial
appointment of a Civil Service Commission; section 63b108 provides for the, sub-
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Since the record presented a legitimate "controversy between plaintiff and defendant" concerning a "final decision of an independent
administrative agency," the Department of Registration & Education
5
was held to have standing to seek judicial review.1
Answered indirectly in the supreme court's decision is the appellate dissent of Judge Craven, who failed to find any statutory scheme
authorizing "a state agency to appeal an order of the Commission,"
and absent a specific legislative mandate to that effect, Judge Craven
would not allow a complaining agency standing.46 The supreme
court, however, pointed to at least three statutes, which, taken con47
junctively would seem to indicate a sufficient legislative design.
Furthermore, it may be argued that due to the paucity of relevant
legislation, administrative law necessarily depends upon case law for
direction, rather than upon purely statutory schemes. 8
Lake County Contractors Association v. Pollution Control Board49
Section 1041 of the Environmental Protection Act allows "any
party adversely affected by a final order" of the Pollution Control
Board to seek judicial review of the Board's decision.5" Does "party"
mean that any "person" injured by an administrative action has
standing to challenge the action, or does it mean that only a "party
of record" may secure a review?
The question arose from a 1971 Board ruling that the North Shore
Sanitary District could not permit any further sewer connection admitting of proposed Department of Personnel rules to the commission, and the rules,
unless disapproved, would have legal effects; section 63b110 gives the commission

certain administrative power over the Director of Personnel and the workings of
the department. See 53 Ill. 2d at 525, 292 N.E.2d at 898-99.
45. 53 Ill. 2d at 525, 292 N.E.2d at 899.
46. Dep't of Registration and Educ. v. Aman, 3 Ill. App. 3d 784, 790, 279 N.E.2d
114, 119, citing Davis, Standing of a Public Official to Challenge Agency Decisions,

16 AD. L. REv. 163 (1963).
47. See note 43, supra. The cited passages seem to say that agencies, such as
the Civil Service Commission, which adopt the ARA shall have the Review Act as
the only vehicle for the appeal of administrative decisions.
48. At least one authority indicates that the scarcity of comprehensive administrative legislation (in procedural matters at any rate) compels "decisoinal law
and perhaps treatises and journal articles" to serve as the primary source of guidance.

Freehling, Administrative Procedure Legislation in Illinois, 57 ILL. B.J. 364, 365
(1969).
49. 54 Ill. 2d 16, 294 N.E.2d 259 (1973).
50. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 ,§ 1041 (1971).
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County Contractors Association and the Lake County Home Builders Association were not parties of record and did not appear in any
stage of the proceedings; nonetheless, the Associations, alleging financial hardship as a result of the decision, challenged the Board's
order before the Second District Appellate Court.
52
Although the appellate majority denied the petitioners a review,

Judge Moran delivered a strong dissent in support of the Associations. He found that four separate classes of persons are given the
right of review under section 1041. Three of the categories, by their
language apply to parties of record, while the fourth pertains to
classes like the Association. 3 The fourth category, taken in tandem
with the supreme court rule governing review of administrative or-

ders, as well as the rule's historical development 4 and the cases construing it,55 lead to the conclusion that "a person, not a party to the
record, is entitled to appeal. ' 6
Taking the case before the supreme court, the Associations con-

tended that the use of "party" in category four indicated a legisla51. The Board's ruling generated a welter of litigation; see North Shore Sanitary Dist. v. Pollution Control Bd., 5 Ill. App. 3d 1050, 284 N.E.2d 376 (1972);
North Shore Sanitary Dist. v. Pollution Control Bd., 2 Ill.
App. 3d 797, 277
N.E.2d 754 (1972).
52. Lake County Contractors Ass'n v. Pollution Control Bd., 6 Ill. App. 3d 762,
286 N.E.2d 600 (1972).
53. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/,, § 1041 (1971): "[1] Any party to a Board hearing, [2] any person who filed a complaint on which hearing was denied, [3] any
person who has been denied a variance or permit under this Act, and [4] any party
adversely affected by a final order or determination of the Board may obtain judicial
review .. "
54. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IIOA, § 335(h)(1) (1971) (Supreme Court Rule 335),
provides that Supreme Court Rules 301-376 are applicable under this rule; ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110A, § 301 (1971) (Supreme Court Rule 301) according to the committee comments, was designed to incorporate the last two sentences of section 74(1)
of the Civil Practice Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 74(1) (1971), which stipulated that the right of any person not a party to the record to review a judgment
is preserved. Deploying this clever argument, Moran opined that the Associations
had standing to seek review. See 6 Ill. App. 3d at 768-69, 286 N.E.2d at 604-05.
55. See People ex rel. Yohnka v. Kennedy, 367 Ill. 236, 238, 10 N.E.2d 806,
807 (1937), suggested that an injured person, not a party to the record, may be
entitled to a review if his interest either appears in the record or can be alleged
in the facts for which reversal is sought. See also Vece v. DeBlase, 31 Ill.
2d 542,
544-545, 202 N.E.2d 482 (1964); Grennan v. Sheldon, 401 I1. 351, 82 N.E.2d 162
(1948).
56. 6 IlI. App. 3d at 768, 286 N.E.2d at 604.
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tive intent to expand the range of persons qualifying for judicial review.57 The court, however, reasoned that since the Environmental

Protection Act incorporates the review provisions of the Administrative Review Act,5 and since under that statute "judicial review of
administrative decisions can be sought only by those who were parties to the . . . proceedings," the Associations were not entitled to
59

appeal.
Clarifying the "person-party" controversy of section 1041, the
court held that analysis of relevant case law and statutes60 indicates

that "party" means "party to the proceeding." If the Associations'
definition prevailed, the fourth category would conflict with variance
procedures which allow non-parties of record relief, as well as the
orderly working of the Act."1 The contentions in Judge Moran's
dissent were also answered: the supreme court rule cited does not

provide for the Associations' allegations in the form for a review
petition, 2 and the Administrative Review Act
does not allow "new
63
or additional evidence" introduced on appeal.
Unanswered, however, was Judge Moran's retort to the argument
of "interference with the orderly working of the act" on which the
supreme court in part relied. Judge Moran contended:
57. 54 I11. 2d at 19, 294 N.E.2d at 261. The Association argued a strict definition of "party" would make the contested category four superfluous, since anyone
given standing in a strictly interpreted reading of category four would already have
standing under category one.
58. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/, § 1041 (1971), states that a "petition for review" must be filed "pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative Review Act."
59. 54 Ill. 2d at 19, 294 N.E.2d at 261.
60. 54 Ill. 2d at 19, 294 N.E.2d at 261, citing 222 E. Chestnut Street Corp. v.
Bd. of Appeals, 10 Ill. 2d 130, 132, 139 N.E.2d 221, 222 (1957), suggests that only
"parties of record in the proceeding" had the right to review. Additionally, passages of the applicable statutes referring to "person" and "party" indicate the two
are not synonymous, and that "party" means "party of record." ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 111Y, § 1003 (1971) defines "person" as "any individual . . . or any other
legal entity . . . " ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2, § 1032 (1971) says "any person may
submit written statements to the Board," but "[any party to a hearing" may be
represented by counsel. The majority states "[there is no reason to believe [the
legislature] was any less careful in its use of the word 'party' in the fourth category
[of § 1041]."
61. 54 Ill. 2d at 19, 294 N.E.2d at 261, citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111Y2, § 1035,
1036 (1971).
62. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IOA, § 335 (1971).
63. See ILL. REV. STAT. cl. 110, § 274 (1971); 54 Il. 2d at 21, 294 N.E.2d
at 262.
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Under [the majority's] rationale we could also decide that a direct appeal
to [the appellate court] as provided by the Act is not permissible 'because
. . .it conflicts with existing provisions and interpretation of the Administrative Review Act.' See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, Ch. 110, Sec. 268 where it
is provided that review of final administrative decision is vested in the
64
Circuit Courts.

Consequently, the supreme court in Aman and Lake County Contractors Association may have illuminated some of the problems of
standing in administrative law; yet, as Judge Moran's contentions evidence, standing in Illinois administrative law remains confusing and
contradictory.
EVIDENTIARY FINDINGS

In two appeals from orders of the Illinois Commerce Commission, the oldest Illinois regulatory agency, important decisions were
rendered regarding the extent to which an agency order must be
substantiated by precise findings as to each evidentiary fact or claim.
In Sunset Trails Water Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 65 the Commission was confronted with the question of which
of two alternate proposals for a residential water system should be
approved-one as a public enterprise and the other as a private venture. The Commission decided that a unified public water system
would be most conducive to public convenience and necessity. Despite the detailed proof presented by the proponent of the privately
owned system, the Commission's order was held sufficient, even in
absence of precise findings as to every evidentiary claim raised by
the plaintiff. 66
Subsequent to the Sunset Trails case, an analogous issue was raised
in Central Illinois Light Co. v. Commerce Commission.6 7 Fortysix railroads sought an increase in Illinois intrastate rates. Upon
approval of the rate increases, several electrical utilities sought a rehearing which ultimately resulted in a reversal of the Commission's
order.
The appellate court reinstated the order, holding that the degree
of specificity of the Commission's order would affect the degree of
64. 6 Il. App. 3d at 769,286 N.E.2d at 605.
65. 7 Ill. App. 3d 449, 287 N.E.2d 736 (1972).
66. Id. at 457,. 287 N.E.2d at 741 (emphasis added)..
67. 10 111. App. 3d 370, 294 N.E.2d 89 (1973).
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accuracy required in the methods of accounting used by the applicant.68 The court also noted that there are peculiar aspects of
accounting for each type of regulated activity, and conceded that
data substantiating the reasonableness of rate increases for three railroads could well be sufficiently representative of conditions among
all the applicants as to preclude the necessity for further refinement of
the evidence. 69
CONCLUSION

The many recent significant developments in Illinois administrative law-as seen in the courts, before the agencies themselves, and
in the legislature-indicate the prolixity and complexity of the administrative law field. Old values were confirmed in areas of manifest weight; recent problems were solved regarding issues of standing; new problems were presented in the topic of administrative
sanctions; and possible new solutions may be indicated in the form
of proposed legislation. In any event, the impact of recent trends
in the administrative law of Illinois is bound to be far-reaching and
noteworthy.

68.
69.

Id. at 376, 294 N.E.2d at 94.
id. at 377, 294 N.E.2d at 95.

